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Research  has  shown  that framing  decisions  as gains  or losses  distorts  human  judgment.  Human  judgment
is  also assumed  to be inﬂuenced  by  the actual  level  of  construal.  Whether  decisions  are  construed  in  a more
detailed manner  (low  level  construal)  or  in  a more  abstract  manner  (high  level  construal)  can  depend
on  perceived  psychological  distance.  In the present  studies,  we  examined  the  inﬂuence  of framing  and
psychological  distance  on  risk  taking.  In three  studies  with  students  (n = 65),  physicians  (n  =  60),  and
hotel  managers  (n = 39),  we found  evidence  that  construal  level  inﬂuences  risk  seeking  in gain  situations,sychological distance
isk
ecision making
raming
rospect theory
but  not  in loss  situations.  Furthermore,  the framing  effect  could  be  replicated  in  psychologically  close
situations,  and  was  eliminated  (Studies  1 and  2)  or reversed  (Study  3)  in  psychologically  distant  situations.
Our  ﬁndings  illuminate  the  interplay  of  framing  and construal  level,  and  points  out  their applicability  in
organizational  decision  making.
© 2014  Society  for Applied  Research  in Memory  and  Cognition.  Published  by Elsevier Inc.  This is an
open  access  article  under  the CC  BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/What inﬂuences professional decision making? According to
heories of bounded rationality (e.g., Selten, 2001; Simon, 1955,
991), people do not always carefully analyze decision problems,
ut often rely on intuitions and heuristics when making decisions.
ased on this differentiation, several researchers have proposed
wo cognitive systems: While system 1 is intuitive, fast and auto-
atic, system 2 is deliberative, slower and controllable (see Evans,
009 for an overview; Kahneman, 2003; Stanovich & West, 2000).
esearch suggests that relying on intuitions and applying rules
f thumb (heuristics) can improve decision making (Gigerenzer,
odd, & The ABC Research Group, 1999), but can also lead to
ertain biases that distort judgments (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman,
974).
In this article we focus on the heuristics-and-biases program
s Tversky and Kahneman (1974) have introduced it. Conclusions
rom their research have made it outside of science into practical
ecision making and have led to awareness for at least some of
hese biases. For example, due to an increasing amount of popu-
ar press on the topic, decision makers might be aware of the fact
hat unrelated pieces of information (anchors) can inﬂuence sub-
equent decisions, or that intensive press coverage makes events
eem more likely than they really are (Kahneman, Lovallo, & Sibony,
011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Most decision makers might
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E-mail addresses: martina.raue@psy.lmu.de (M.  Raue), streicher@psy.lmu.de
B. Streicher), eva.lermer@psy.lmu.de (E. Lermer), dieter.frey@psy.lmu.de (D. Frey).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jarmac.2014.09.005
211-3681/© 2014 Society for Applied Research in Memory and Cognition. Published by 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
also know that the framing of decisions in terms of gains and losses
can lead to contradicting decisions in objectively identical prob-
lems. This phenomenon has become known as the framing effect
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).
But does it also make a difference whether a decision is made for
oneself, a close friend, or an employee? Will a manager take more
risks when he makes a decision for a branch in another country than
when making the same decision for a branch in his home country?
The interplay of psychological distance and risk taking in profes-
sional settings is not often explored. Therefore, we investigated
these questions in three studies that illuminate how practitioners’
decisions under risk might be distorted.
Decisions under risk have received special attention by Slovic
(2010) who  assumes that risk perception is usually accompanied
by some form of emotion or affect. The perception of risks as feel-
ings thus leads to a reliance on intuition and a neglect of objective
probabilities when judging risks (e.g., Slovic, 2010; Slovic & Peters,
2006; Slovic & Västfjäll, 2010). This has, for example, been demon-
strated for simple investment choices: While healthy people lost
money, patients who  lacked affect due to neurological impairment
did not (Shiv, Loewenstein, Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2007).
De Martino (2006) points out that affect also inﬂuences the framing
effect, and experiments using magnetic resonance imaging suggest
that the framing effect is stronger among people who  strongly rely
on their intuitions (Kahneman & Frederick, 2007). Based on these
ﬁndings, we argue that risk taking behavior is a form of intuitive
decision making and investigated how it is affected by the level of
construal.
Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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. Construal level and decision making
Construal level theory of psychological distance is based on the
ssumption that only the here and now can be directly experienced;
he future, other places and other people are believed to be repre-
ented in a more abstract way such as imaginations, memories,
lans or hopes. Therefore, the theory states that objects, events or
ndividuals are represented as either close or distant. The reference
oint is thereby the self in the here and now, from which an object
an move away in terms of time, space, social distance or hypothet-
cality. While psychological distance has been linked to abstract,
igh level construals like broad concepts of the object, psychologi-
al closeness has been linked to concrete, low level construals such
s discrete features of the object (Trope & Liberman, 2010). This
lso works vice versa in the way people judge abstract objects to
e more distant (Bar-Anan, Liberman, & Trope, 2006).
Empirical studies support the notion that psychological distance
s associated with decision making by activating a certain level of
onstrual (Trope & Liberman, 2010; Trope, Liberman, & Wakslak,
007). For example, participants who were asked to give advice to
nother person concerning a job offer that was perceived as distant,
ave more weight to abstract attributes (e.g., personal satisfaction)
han concrete attributes (e.g., salary; Kray, 2000). Another Study
emonstrated that participants were less prone to the sunk cost
ias (continuing to invest in an already failing project; Arkes &
lumer, 1985) when the investing company was  located in a dis-
ant as opposed to a near location (Wakslak & Liberman, 2006).
esearch in consumer behavior has demonstrated that people pre-
er to wait for a product delivery and save the fee when the product
s described in a more abstract manner, as opposed to a concrete
anner (Malkoc, Zauberman, & Bettman, 2010).
Especially important decisions (e.g., high stake decisions) usu-
lly involve thinking about consequences, and are thus suggested
o be inﬂuenced by the activated level of construal (Kim, Schnall,
 White, 2013). Trope and Liberman (2010) highlight that induc-
ng a concrete mindset (low level construal) shifts the focus onto
he feasibility of an action (e.g., probability of a positive outcome),
hile an abstract mindset (high level construal) shifts the focus on
ts desirability (e.g., attractiveness of the outcome). For example,
n time-dependent gambling tasks participants preferred gambles
ith high probability in the near future, but gambles with a high
utcome in the distant future. As a conclusion, the authors pro-
ose that temporal distance should lead to more risk seeking due
o a focus on the desirability of an outcome (Sagristano, Trope, &
iberman, 2002). Getting back to the framing effect, Trautmann and
an de Kuilen (2012) point out that people intuitively interpret
rospects in risky decisions as either desirable or feasible. The inter-
lay of construal level and risk seeking has recently been further
nvestigated in a series of studies that experimentally manipulated
he level of construal by different ways of priming. Participants
ho were primed with a high (versus low) construal level engaged
n more risk taking and judged risks as less probable (Lermer,
treicher, Sachs, Raue, & Frey, 2014a; Streicher, Lermer, Sachs, &
rey, 2012). This is also in line with ﬁndings by Wakslak and Trope
2009), who demonstrated that participants in a high level con-
trual mindset made lower probability judgments in neutral tasks
han participants in a low level construal mindset.
The current studies add to these ﬁndings by investigating the
nﬂuence of psychological distance in risky decision tasks, which
s believed to better reﬂect practical decision making than a prim-
ng of construal level. Furthermore, the current studies not only
ake a look at gain situations, but also at loss situations and espe-
ially focus on decision making of practitioners. It has repeatedly
een demonstrated that people engage in more risk seeking behav-
or when confronted with potential losses as opposed to potential
ains. This behavior is known as loss aversion and assumed to beemory and Cognition 4 (2015) 256–264 257
grounded on people’s hope to avoid the unpleasant experience
of loss (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992).
While we have introduced research that investigated the inﬂu-
ence of construal level on risk seeking in gain situations, there
is a lack of research looking at the inﬂuence of construal level
in loss situations. Shelley (1991), for example, explored whether
a time delay in losses affects risk seeking and could not draw
a clear picture. A series of ﬁeld experiments on risk communi-
cation demonstrated that persuasive loss framed messages were
stronger when paired with concrete features, while gain framed
messages were stronger when paired with abstract features (White,
MacDonnell, & Dahl, 2011). Furthermore, loss framed messages
activated a more concrete mindset, while gain framed messages
activated a more abstract mindset. In a similar line of research, the
impact of persuasive gain framed messages was stronger when they
concerned socially distant as opposed to socially proximal entities
(Nan, 2007). Interestingly, in this experiment, the impact of loss-
framed messages was  not inﬂuenced by psychological distance.
These ﬁndings could be explained by the noted assumption that
people focus on the desirability of an outcome when in an abstract
mindset (e.g., attractive gain), and on its feasibility when in a con-
crete mindset (e.g., chance of avoiding loss). Therefore, we expect
an opposite effect of psychological distance in loss situations com-
pared to gain situations. This is further supported by experiments
connecting regulatory focus theory (Crowe & Higgins, 1997) and
construal level theory: Participants in a concrete mindset preferred
a prevention focus (avoiding loss) over a promotion focus (attaining
gains; Förster & Higgins, 2005; see Bryant & Dunford, 2008 for an
overview).
Decision makers are constantly confronted with different
dimensions of psychological distance. Their decisions can have
immediate (time: proximal) or long-term consequences (time: dis-
tal); can concern the people around them (space: proximal) or
people in another country (space: distal); or can affect themselves,
their company (social distance: proximal), or other companies
(social distance: distal). Numerous laboratory and ﬁeld experi-
ments have already shown that there are discrepancies in decision
making based on whether the decision is made for oneself versus
someone else (Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2012; Hsee & Weber,
1997; Polman, 2012; Stone, Yates, & Caruthers, 2002), for now
versus later (Malkoc, Zauberman, & Ulu, 2005; Pronin, Olivola,
& Kennedy, 2007; Sagristano et al., 2002), or for here versus a
distant location (Goodman & Malkoc, 2012). Additionally, empir-
ical research has suggested that the perceived distance can also
be inﬂuenced indirectly. An example highly relevant for the pro-
fessional context is politeness. Politeness creates social distance
and distance, in turn, causes people to act more politely (Stephan,
Liberman, & Trope, 2010). The manner in which clear facts are pre-
sented can also lead to a variation in perceived distance. Targets
or events presented in larger numbers and smaller units, such as
7 days, were shown to be perceived more concrete and as more
dangerous than smaller numbers and larger units, such as 1 week
(White & Kwan, 2013). Therefore, manipulating construal level via
psychological distance is highly reﬂecting real life situations. Psy-
chological distance is thus assumed to directly inﬂuence the level
of construal and, in turn, guide judgment and decision making (Bar-
Anan et al., 2006; Fujita, Henderson, Eng, Trope, & Liberman, 2006;
Trope et al., 2007).
In the present research, we  investigated the inﬂuence of con-
strual level on intuitive decision making in risky choice problems by
manipulating psychological distance, because distance dimensions
are more or less inherent in every decision. In different decision
problems, we  varied several dimensions of psychological distance
such as social, spatial and temporal distance. In each problem,
two or three of these dimensions were combined in a way that
was still realistic for the participants. We  aimed at exploring how
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Concerning the manipulation check, a t-test revealed that par-
ticipants in the proximal condition (M = 3.15, SD = 1.21) showed
lower ratings than participants in the distal condition (M = 3.91,
SD = 1.04), t(63) = 2.78, p = .007, d = .69, thus suggesting a successful58 M. Raue et al. / Journal of Applied Researc
imple changes of perceived distance in the description of decision
roblems inﬂuence intended risk taking behavior. Furthermore, we
nvestigated how effects of psychological distance interact with the
ell-known framing effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). To date,
his interaction remains largely unexplored (cf. Trautmann & Van
e Kuilen, 2012), but is of great importance for practitioners, who
an be confronted with both effects at the same time.
. Hypotheses
The present investigation consisted of three studies: Study 1 was
onducted in a university setting and the other two  studies with
ractitioners, speciﬁcally physicians (Study 2) and hotel managers
Study 3). We  measured differences in participants’ preferences for
isk and security in risky choices, framed as either gains or losses,
nd manipulated the level of construal by varying psychological
istance. Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky
 Kahneman, 1981) states that people are risk averse when con-
ronted with gains and risk seeking when confronted with losses,
hich can be induced by the framing of decisions as gains or losses.
ccording to recent research on construal level theory (Trope &
iberman, 2010), which shows that people are risk averse when in
ow construal level mindset and risk seeking when in an high con-
trual level mindset, construal level is expected to moderate the
nﬂuence of framing effects on decision making. We  expect that
n increase of construal level shifts the focus on the desirability
f the outcome. While in a gain frame, this should lead to more
isk seeking, in a loss frame we expect more risk avoidance due to
he unattractiveness of the potential loss. This may  be stated in the
ollowing formal hypotheses:
ypothesis 1a. In a gain frame, people are more risk averse in a
ow construal level than in a high construal level mindset.
ypothesis 1b. In a loss frame, people are more risk seeking in a
ow construal level than in a high construal level mindset.
While Hypotheses 1a and 1b were developed prior to col-
ecting the data, the analysis indicated a second hypothesis that
e approached in an exploratory manner:
ypothesis 2. A low construal level leads to stronger framing
ffects than a high construal level.
. Study 1
.1. Method
.1.1. Participants and design
Our sample included 65 students (72% female) aged 18 to 47
M = 23.03, SD = 5.27) from a German university who agreed to par-
icipate in this study. The participants were recruited during lecture
nd were given a brief paper-and-pencil survey that included an
nrelated study. For participating in both studies they received
ourse credit, and had the chance of winning one out of three text-
ooks on social psychology. Participants were randomly assigned to
ne of two conditions of the 2 (between) × 2 (within) mixed design.
he between-subjects variable was psychological distance (proxi-
al  vs. distal) and the within-subjects variable was framing (loss
s. gain).
.1.2. Materials and procedure
We used the Asian disease problem as gain frame (Tversky &
ahneman, 1981) and a similar problem as loss frame to measure
he inﬂuence of construal level on decision making in an applied
nd established setting. Construal level was manipulated by fram-
ng the problem as psychologically proximal (low construal level) or
istal (high construal level). In the gain frame problem, participantsemory and Cognition 4 (2015) 256–264
in the proximal condition were given the following instruction
(parentheses excluded):
Imagine you are part of a student board (social dimension)  at
your University that is included in important decisions. Cur-
rently (temporal dimension), your city (spatial dimension)  is being
threatened by a new ﬂu virus that is expected to kill 600 inha-
bitants. Two  alternative programs to combat the disease have
been proposed.
In the distal condition participants were asked to imagine being
a consultant in health care, and that an unusual disease will be
threatening some countries in the coming months. The loss frame
problem concerned employees that have to be dismissed. Partici-
pants in the proximal condition were asked to imagine they worked
for a company in the same city as their university. The participants
immediately had to lay off 300 employees along with their super-
visor. In the distal condition, participants were asked to imagine
being a consultant for a company abroad that will have to dis-
miss 300 employees the following year. However, participants were
offered two  options that included the possibility of having to dis-
miss fewer employees. Instead of making a choice between options,
we asked for participants’ preference for the safe (e.g., 200 employ-
ees will be dismissed) or the risky alternative (e.g., 1/3 probability
that nobody will be dismissed or 2/3 probability that 300 employ-
ees will be dismissed) on a six-point Likert scale from 1 (strong
preference for the safe option)  to 6 (strong preference for the risky
option). The manipulation check consisted of three items concern-
ing perceived distance, concreteness and hypotheticality of both
decision problems on a 5-point scale from 1 (proximal) to 5 (distal),
 ˛ = .73.
3.2. Results and discussion
A 2 (psychological distance) × 2 (framing) repeated measure
ANOVA did not show main effects, but indicated an interaction of
framing and psychological distance, F(1, 62) = 6.72, p = .01, p2 = .10.
In the gain frame, low psychological distance led to more risk
avoidance and high psychological distance to more risk seeking,
t(63) = 2.65, p = .01, d = .67 (see Fig. 1). In the loss frame, there was
no inﬂuence of psychological distance on risk seeking. Furthermore,
in the proximal condition, participants preferred the safe option in
the gain frame and the risky option in the loss frame, t(31) = 2.33,
p = .027, d = .61, which replicates the framing effect. However, in
the distal condition there was no difference between participants’
preferences.Fig. 1. Preference for the risky option in the proximal versus distal condition, in the
gain  and the loss frame. Error bars indicate 95% conﬁdence intervals.
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anipulation of psychological distance. By manipulating psycho-
ogical distance, we aimed at activating low or high level construals
hen thinking about risky choices. In line with Hypothesis 1a, peo-
le were more risk averse in the proximal/gain frame condition
han in the distal/gain frame condition. There was no effect of psy-
hological distance on the loss frame condition and Hypothesis 1b
ould not be supported. However, since the tendency is in line with
ypothesis 1b, the manipulation of construal level might have been
tronger in the gain condition than in the loss condition. Saving or
osing lives might be more polarizing than dismissing or keeping
mployees. Furthermore, the framing effect could only be repli-
ated in the proximal condition, but was eliminated in the distal
ondition, which supports Hypothesis 2. Still, the different setting
f the gain and loss frame might have confounded our results. Based
n the assumption that intuitive decision making develops through
xperience (e.g., Betsch, 2008; Klein, 1993; Reyna, 2004), one might
riticize that the student sample used in Study 1 did not rely on
heir intuitions when considering the options due to a lack of expe-
ience with the topic. Therefore, in Studies 2 and 3, which were
onducted parallel, we investigated practitioners’ decision making
n their ﬁelds of expertise.
. Study 2
The ﬁndings from Study 1 suggest an interaction of gain versus
oss framing and the level of construal that inﬂuences risky choice
ehavior. In Studies 2 and 3, we further investigated this interplay
nd its applicability in organizational decision making. We  chose
o study physicians and hotel managers, since we had easy access
o both of these samples. In professional settings, decision makers
re continuously confronted with problems that are framed either
s rather proximal or rather distal. Following Trope et al. (2007),
his framing activates different mindsets. Physicians are one group
f professionals that have to make high-stake and often quick deci-
ions on a daily basis. For example, in 2012, physicians in Germany
ere on strike because the regulations of health insurance com-
anies shortened their fees for consultations. This development
eads to less time spent with each patient, which is accompanied
y more anonymity in medical ofﬁces, and therefore an increase
n perceived social distance. An even stronger perceived social and
lso spatial distance is assumed to be found in online consultations.
nﬂuenced only by the activated level of construal, the ﬁnal medi-
al decision or advice might be completely different and potential
onsequences can be severe. Therefore, it is highly relevant to inves-
igate whether our ﬁndings also affect professionals in a clinical
etting.
.1. Method
.1.1. Participants and design
Overall, 150 physicians started the online questionnaire. Of
hese participants, 72 cancelled the survey at one point, 17 had to be
xcluded due to technical problems of the survey tool, and one due
o not being a physician. Overall, 60 physicians (54% female) aged
7 to 61 (M = 37.31, SD = 8.43) from Germany completed the survey.
he study was conducted online and 124 physicians of different
pecializations were contacted directly through e-mail (based on
ersonal contacts and online search). However, since e-mails were
orwarded from physicians to their colleagues and we also pro-
oted the study on Facebook, a clear dropout rate could not be
alculated.
The specializations of the physicians included primary care,
nesthesia, cardiology, orthopedics, gynecology, surgery, pedi-
trics, dermatology, urology, internal medicine, and psychiatrics.
ost of the participants (34%) had 5 to 10 years experience, 30%emory and Cognition 4 (2015) 256–264 259
had 1 to 4 years experience, 16% had 10 to 20 years experience,
13% had more than 20 years experience, and 5% had less than 1
year experience. For participating in the study, physicians had the
chance of winning one out of two  books on medical decision mak-
ing. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions
of the 2 (between) × 4 (within) mixed design. The between-subjects
variable was  psychological distance (proximal vs. distal) and the
within-subjects variable was framing (2 × loss vs. 2 × gain).
4.1.2. Materials and procedure
Participants were presented with four medical decision prob-
lems, either described as psychologically proximal (n = 28) or
psychologically distal (n = 32), in random order: two  in a gain frame
(decision 1 and 2) and two  in a loss frame (decision 3 and 4).
Decision 1 concerned an individual treatment, decision 2 a gen-
eral treatment (adopted from Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2012),
decision 3 was  the Asian disease problem (Tversky & Kahneman,
1981), which is also a general treatment decision, and decision 4
concerned an individual treatment decision. Each problem offered
a risky option with a high outcome and a safe option with a low
outcome, analogue to the classic Asian disease problem, which was
also included. Choice options did not differ in expected value.
Construal level was  manipulated by psychological distance in
the way that the problems varied in terms of temporal, social, and
spatial distance. As an example, decision 2 was described as follows
(the distance manipulation is highlighted through bold letters):
Proximal condition: You would like to implement an innova-
tive treatment concept for 100 of your patients whose health
situation has not improved with the standard treatment. Today
you need to decide how to proceed.
Distal condition: Next month a new colleague will start in
your practice and would like to implement an innovative treat-
ment concept for 100 patients whose health situation has not
improved with the standard treatment. Which approach would
you prefer?
Concept A: There is an 80% probability that the health situation
of 40 patients will improve.
Concept B: The health situation of 30 patients will surely
improve.
In order to get a clearer picture of participants’ preferences,
we changed the rating scheme from Study 1 to Study 2. Besides
making a choice between the options, participants indicated their
preference for the risky alternative (concept A in the example) and
their preference for the safe alternative (concept B in the example)
separately and for each situation on a 7-point scale from 1 (little
preference) to 7 (strong preference).
5. Results and discussion
Participants’ choices show clear differences between gain and
loss frames, but not between psychological distance conditions (see
Figs. 2 and 3). The analysis of our data supports this notion, espe-
cially for one gain–loss pair in the proximal condition: Participants
preferred the sure option in decision 1 (gain) and the risky option
in decision 4 (loss), 2 (1, 28) = 4.77, p = .029, which are the individ-
ual treatment decisions. This is in line with prospect theory, stating
that people are risk averse in gain frames and risk seeking in loss
frames. In sum, in the analysis of choices, we  did not ﬁnd support for
Hypotheses 1a and 1b. Nevertheless, there was a framing effect in
the proximal, but not in the distal condition, which is in line with
Hypothesis 2. Descriptively, the distal condition also showed the
framing effect, but obviously weaker and therefore still supports
Hypothesis 2.
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Fig. 2. Choice of physicians between the sure and the risky option for each decision
in  the proximal condition.
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Fig. 5. Preference for the risky option in the proximal versus the distal condition, in
the gain (decision 1 and decision 2) and the loss frame (decision 3 and decision 4).ig. 3. Choice of physicians between the sure and the risky option for each decision
n  the distal condition.
In the next step, we took a look at the preferences for
ach option. A 2 (psychological distance) × 4 (framing) repeated
easures ANOVA revealed that participants had higher prefer-
nces for the sure option in the gain than in the loss decisions,
(3, 174) = 49.66, p < .001, p2 = .46, and higher preferences for the
isky option in the loss than in the gain decisions, F(3, 174) = 50.56,
 < .001, p2 = .47. This replicates the classic framing effect. Pre-
erences for the sure option were not affected by psychological
istance (see Fig. 4), F(3, 174) = 1.17, p = .32, p2 = .02, but pre-
erences for the risky option were affected by an interaction of
raming and psychological distance (see Fig. 5), F(3, 174) = 4.40,
 = .01,  2 = .07.p
A further investigation of that interaction revealed that psycho-
ogical distance seems to affect the general, but not the individual,
reatment decisions. The individual treatment decisions 1 and 4
ig. 4. Preference for the sure option in the proximal versus the distal condition, in
he gain (decision 1 and decision 2) and the loss frame (decision 3 and decision 4).
rror bars indicate 95% conﬁdence intervals.Error bars indicate 95% conﬁdence intervals.
showed strong framing effects, both in the proximal, t(27) = −9.52,
p < .001, d = 2.97, and the distal condition, t(31) = −7.88, p < .001,
d = 1.87, and did not differ across psychological distance conditions.
However, the general decisions 2 and 3 revealed an interesting
pattern: Participants were more risk seeking in decision 2 (gain)
in the distal than in the proximal condition, t(58) = −2.65, p = .01,
d = .69, which supports Hypothesis 1a. As shown in Fig. 5, the ten-
dency of decision 3 (and also decision 4, both loss) is in line with
Hypothesis 1b, indicating more risk seeking for the proximal than
the distal condition, but this is not supported statistically. Further-
more, while we  found a framing effect for decisions 2 and 3 in
the proximal condition, t(58) = −3.56, p = .001, d = 1.00, the fram-
ing effect disappeared in the distal condition, t < 1. This strongly
supports Hypothesis 2, stating that the framing effect is weaker in
the distal than in the proximal condition.
As in Study 1, Study 2 revealed an interaction of framing and
psychological distance for general treatment decisions, indicating
that construal level moderates framing effects. In line with Hypoth-
esis 1a, physicians were more risk averse in the low construal
level/gain frame condition than in the high construal level/gain
frame condition. We  also found some descriptive support for
Hypothesis 1b, showing that risk seeking is lower in the high con-
strual level/loss frame compared to the low construal level/loss
frame condition. Furthermore, we found a framing effect in the
proximal, but not in the distal condition, indicating support for
Hypothesis 2.
The individual treatment decisions did show a framing effect,
but were not affected by psychological distance manipulation. An
explanation could be that the high construal level manipulation
failed for decisions 1 and 4. The fact that these decisions concerned
individual treatments might have reduced perceived psychological
distance. This notion is supported by the fact that, across condi-
tions and especially concerning preferences for the risky option,
we found a difference within the gain frame (decisions 1 and
2), t(59) = −7.02, p < .001, d = 1.02, and the loss frame (decisions 3
and 4), t(59) = −4.30, p < .001, d = .60. While decision 1 shows high
risk avoidance, decision 4 shows high risk seeking. Based on our
hypotheses, this indicates that both decisions are perceived as psy-
chologically proximal.
Study 2 further supports the ﬁndings of Study 1, indicating that
construal level moderates the framing effect. Participants were
more risk seeking in psychologically distal as opposed to psy-
chological proximal gain frames. High psychological distance and
therefore an activation of high level construals not only led to a
reduction of the framing effect, but rather eliminated it. The fact
that we  did not ﬁnd this for individual treatment decisions might
be due to a failed high construal level manipulation, as mentioned
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the reason that our analyses do not reach an acceptable level of
statistical signiﬁcance.
We found the classic framing effect for decisions 2 (more secu-
rity seeking in the gain frame) and 3 (more risk seeking in the
Fig. 6. Choice of hotel managers between the sure and the risky option for each
decision in the proximal condition.M. Raue et al. / Journal of Applied Researc
bove. Overall, results from Study 2 replicate the ﬁndings from
tudy 1 in a professional setting.
. Study 3
Study 3 was conducted parallel to Study 2 with the same design,
ut instead of physicians we asked hotel managers. Therefore, the
ontent of the problems was adapted to a management setting.
anagers are another group of professionals that have to make
igh-stake ﬁnancial or personnel decisions on a daily basis. For
xample, perceived closeness or distance toward employees might
nﬂuence personnel decisions. Investment decisions that imply
ome kind of distance might affect the invested amount. We  devel-
ped four decision tasks in a hotel management setting and chose
ifferent topics (e.g., money, employees) in order to increase the
hances of replicating the framing effect.
.1. Method
.1.1. Participants and design
Overall, 92 hotel managers started the online questionnaire. Of
hese, 53 cancelled the survey at one point, while 39 hotel managers
19% female) aged 23 to 69 (M = 44.44, SD = 12.35) from Germany
articipated in the whole study. The study was conducted online
nd 100 hotel managers were contacted directly through e-mail
based on personal contacts and online search). However, since e-
ails were forwarded from managers to their colleagues and we
lso promoted the study on Facebook, a clear dropout rate could
ot be calculated. Over half (59%) of the participants managed a
edium-sized hotel with 11 to 50 employees, about one fourth
24%) managed a larger-sized hotel with 51–100 employees, and
he rest managed smaller (10%) or larger (7%) hotels. Most of the
articipants (34%) had 10 to 20 years experience running a hotel,
bout one fourth (22%) had more than 20 years experience, 12% had
 to 10 years experience, 20% had 1 to 4 years experience, and 12%
ad less than one year experience. Furthermore, 70% of the hotels
ere four-stars hotels, 24% were three-stars hotels, and the rest
ere either one-star (2%) or ﬁve-stars (4%)1. For participating in
he study, the hotel managers had the chance of winning one out of
wo books on hotel and bar psychology. Participants were randomly
ssigned to one of two  conditions of the 2 (between) × 4 (within)
ixed design. The between-subjects variable was psychological dis-
ance (proximal vs. distal) and the within-subjects variable was
raming (2 × loss vs. 2 × gain).
.1.2. Materials and procedure
Participants were presented with four managerial decision
roblems, either described as psychologically proximal (n = 16) or
sychologically distal (n = 23), in random order: two  in a gain frame
decision 1 and 2) and two in a loss frame (decision 3 and 4). In
ecision 1, a new promotion concept was introduced that could
ncrease the number of guests. In decision 2, an investment in ren-
vation needed to be made that could increase sales. In decision 3,
aving measures needed to be implemented in order to prevent the
ismissal of employees. In decision 4, saving measures needed to
e implemented that implied a reduction of the manager’s salary.
onstrual level was manipulated by psychological distance in the
ay that the problems varied in terms of temporal, social, and spa-
ial distance. As an example, decision 1 was described as follows
the distance manipulation is highlighted through bold letters):
1 One-star = tourist, two-stars = standard, three-stars = comfort, four-stars = ﬁrst
lass, ﬁve-stars = luxury (hotel rating according to the German Hotel and Catering
ssociation).emory and Cognition 4 (2015) 256–264 261
Proximal condition: You urgently need to invest in your orga-
nization and you have decided to immediately renovate some
of your rooms. This very day you want to award the contract
and have to choose between two different offers whose conse-
quences you have already calculated.
Distal condition: A colleague asks you for advice concerning
upcoming possibilities for investment. He would like to ren-
ovate some rooms the following year and he has received
different offers whose consequences he already calculated.
Option A: With this renovation sales will surely increase by 5%.
Option B: With this renovation there is a 50% chance that sales
will increase by 10% and a 50% chance that sales will not increase
at all.
As in Study 2, besides making a choice, participants indicated
their preference for the risky alternative (option B in the example)
and their preference for the safe alternative (option A in the exam-
ple) separately, and for each situation on a 7-point scale from 1
(little preference)  to 7 (strong preference).
6.2. Results and discussion
When we  look at choices (see Figs. 6 and 7), participants had a
clear preference for the risky option in decision 3 (loss) compared
to the remaining decisions. Descriptively, the preference for the
risky option is stronger in the proximal condition as opposed to
the distal condition, which is in line with Hypothesis 1b. However,
the small sample size (n = 16) in the proximal condition might beFig. 7. Choice of hotel managers between the sure and the risky option for each
decision in the distal condition.
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he gain (decision 1 and decision 2) and the loss frame (decision 3 and decision 4).
rror bars indicate 95% conﬁdence intervals.
oss frame), 2 (1, 39) = 4.39, p = .036, across conditions. Our analy-
es further revealed a difference between decisions 1 (gain) and 4
loss) in the distal, 2 (1, 23) = 5.79, p = .016, but not in the proximal
ondition. While participants were indifferent in decision 1 (gain),
hey chose the sure option more often in decision 4 (loss), which
lso supports Hypothesis 1b.
As in Study 2, we also looked at the preference for the sure
nd the risky option separately (see Figs. 8 and 9). A 2 (psycho-
ogical distance) × 4 (framing) repeated measure ANOVA revealed
 main effect of framing for preferences for the sure option, F(3,
11) = 4.25, p = .007, p2 = .103, and preferences for the risky option,
(3, 111) = 4.19, p = .007, p2 = .102. However, psychological dis-
ance did not have an effect on either of the measures, Fs < 1, and
e also do not ﬁnd interactions, Fs < 1.
In order to get a clearer picture of the framing effect, we com-
ared gain–loss pairs separately for each condition. Participants
oth in the proximal, t(15) = 2.29, p = .037, d = .71, and the distal
ondition, t(22) = 2.11, p = .046, d = .56, had higher preferences for
ecurity in decision 2 (gain) than in decision 3 (loss), indicating a
lassic framing effect. However, the effect is weaker in the distal
ondition, which indicates some support for Hypothesis 2.
In line with Hypotheses 1a and 1b, the framing effect is reversed
or decision 1 and decision 4 in the distal condition: While partici-
ants were rather risk seeking in decision 1 (gain), they were rather
isk avoiding in decision 4 (loss), t(22) = 4.60, p < .001, d = .95. At the
ame time, this effect contradicts Hypothesis 2, stating that a high
onstrual level reduces framing effects. However, the reason for this
ffect might also lie in the contents of decisions 1 and 4. While deci-
ion 1 concerns a new advertising concept that might lead to more
15% increase with a chance of 80%) or less (10% increase) overnight
ig. 9. Preference for the risky option in the proximal versus the distal condition, in
he gain (decision 1 and decision 2) and the loss frame (decision 3 and decision 4).
rror bars indicate 95% conﬁdence intervals.emory and Cognition 4 (2015) 256–264
stays, decision 4 concerns saving measurements that might lead to
larger (50% decrease with a chance of 50%) or smaller (25% decrease)
losses in salary for the manager. The risky prospect of decision 4
is quite harmful and might lead to existential problems for the
manager, which could be the reason why we ﬁnd stronger risk aver-
sion in this decision than in all other decisions. Furthermore, due
to their experience, our participants might not have believed in
an advertising concept that surely increases the overnight stays,
plus they also might be used to having some risk when investing in
marketing.
In conclusion, when comparing decisions 2 and 3, we found a
framing effect in the preferences for the sure option, which was
slightly stronger for the proximal than the distal condition and sup-
ports Hypothesis 2. Psychological distance had no effect and we did
not ﬁnd clear support for Hypothesis 1a and 1b. However, when
comparing decisions 1 and 4, the framing effect was reversed for
the distal condition and this ﬁnding partly supports Hypothesis 1a
and 1b, but contradicts Hypothesis 2.
7. General discussion
Our results support the notion that both novices and profes-
sionals are inﬂuenced by perceived psychological distance when
making decisions under risk. In line with Trope and Liberman
(2010), we presumed that a variation in perceived psychological
distance affects the cognitive mindset, leading to more concrete
thinking (low construal level) in psychological close situations and
more abstract thinking (high construal level) in more distant situ-
ations. Overall, two  important results emerged from our studies.
First, in Studies 1 and 2 we found evidence for Hypothesis 1a,
stating that a high construal level leads to less risk avoidance in gain
frames than a low construal level. While the proximal condition
(i.e., low construal level) led to risk avoidance, which is in line with
prospect theory, the distal condition (i.e., high construal level) led
to risk seeking, which contradicts prospect theory. In loss frames,
construal level did not have an inﬂuence on risk seeking, and we
did not ﬁnd evidence for Hypothesis 1b, stating that a low construal
level leads to more risk seeking in loss frames than a high construal
level. However, a reversed framing effect (more risk avoidance in
the loss than in the gain frame) that we found in Study 3 partly
supports both Hypothesis 1a and 1b, but for the distal condition
only. The contradicting results in the loss frames of Studies 1 and 2
may  be due to one of two reasons: either the construal level manip-
ulation was not strong enough, or the inﬂuence of loss aversion is
stronger than the impact of construal level. The phenomenon of loss
aversion, which states that losses loom larger than gains, is seen as
one of the most common biases in decision making (Hastie, 2001;
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, 1992). A
recent series of experiments even suggests that it dominates con-
strual level theory (Trautmann & Van de Kuilen, 2012). This might
explain the resistance of loss aversion to our manipulation, but
needs to be further investigated.
Second, the classic framing effect was replicated for the proxi-
mal  condition, but was eliminated (Studies 1 & 2) or reduced (Study
3) in the distal condition, which supports our exploratory Hypoth-
esis 2, stating that a low construal level leads to stronger framing
effects than a high construal level. Experiments have shown that
the bias of framing can be reduced or even eliminated when peo-
ple rely more on deliberative thinking than on intuitive thinking
(e.g., Keysar, Hayakawa, & An, 2012). Reasons for a shift from intu-
itive to more deliberative thinking might be based on a reduction of
emotional resonance caused by the increase in psychological dis-
tance (Keysar et al., 2012) or on perceived disﬂuency. Disﬂuency
occurs when an experience is more difﬁcult to process cognitively,
for example when a text is written in a font that is hard to read
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Alter & Oppenheimer, 2008). In terms of the framing effect, loss
rames are assumed to be processed more ﬂuently when paired
ith concrete attributes and low psychological distance, respec-
ively (White et al., 2011). Disﬂuency can temper conﬁdence in
ne’s judgment and lead to a shift to more analytical processing
Alter & Oppenheimer, 2008).
In sum, our results suggest that it not only makes a difference
hether a decision is framed in terms of gains or losses (Tversky
 Kahneman, 1981), but also if a decision is framed in terms
f psychological closeness or distance. From physicians who do
nline diagnoses to managers who make high-stake ﬁnancial deci-
ions for international branches, all are confronted with aspects of
sychological distance. While the heuristics-and-biases approach
as a long tradition and received quite a lot of attention in the
eal world, construal level theory is rather new. Construal level
heory explains cognitive mechanisms underlying known psycho-
ogical effects such as time-depended changes in preference (e.g.,
oewenstein, 1987; Thaler, 1992) and phenomena concerning the
sychology of prediction (e.g., the planning fallacy; Kahneman
 Tversky, 1979). Furthermore, construal level theory suggests
hat temporal, social and spatial distance inﬂuence people’s cog-
itive processing of events in the same way. Therefore the theory’s
pplication to practical decision making is especially interesting.
ractitioners need to be made aware of the fact that psychological
istance inherent in a decision problem can inﬂuence their mind-
et and therefore their decision making behavior. A decision maker
ight want to thoroughly consider who is affected by his decision
nd when or where it will come into effect. One or more of these
sychological distance dimensions can be found in almost every
ecision.
In order to improve practical decision making, psychological
istance could be intentionally varied toward a more distant or
 closer perspective. That would provide a decision maker with
he opportunity to illuminate a decision from different distant per-
pectives and consider its inﬂuence on his evaluation. For example,
f a manager is considering making a big investment in another
ountry, he might want to imagine himself being on-site versus far
way, a close friend being affected versus an unknown person, or
he consequences of an immediate implementation versus a future
mplementation. Whether hypotheticality, the fourth dimension of
sychological distance, also inﬂuences practical decision making
eeds to be further investigated.
A great potential concerning the practical application of our
esearch might lie in the ﬁeld of risk communication. As Gigerenzer,
aissmaier, Kurz-Milcke, Schwartz, and Woloshin (2007) propose,
sychological research needs to investigate how to present risks
isually as well as numerically in a way that fosters easy and cor-
ect processing. Based on several experiments, the authors propose
hat risks should be presented in terms of absolute risks instead of
elative risks and as numbers instead of words, since the former
eads to more accurate risk perceptions. Lermer, Streicher, Sachs,
nd Frey (2013) further investigated the presentation of risks and
uggest that the abstractness of the target (e.g., person at risk)
oderates the inﬂuence of presentation format on risk perception.
his indicates that construal level might contribute to the discus-
ion on how to effectively present risks. Studies have pointed out
hat larger numbers and smaller units (e.g., 7 days as opposed to 1
eek) increase perceived harm (White & Kwan, 2013) or that the
resentation of messages as pictures versus words affects perceived
sychological distance. For example, while people preferred pic-
ures when communicating with proximal others, they preferred
ords with distal others. In the same line of research, it was  sug-
ested that people are more likely to heed the advice of a message
f the medium of presentation (as picture or word) is congru-
nt with psychological distance (Amit, Wakslak, & Trope, 2012).
ermer, Streicher, Sachs, Raue, and Frey (2014b), on the other hand,emory and Cognition 4 (2015) 256–264 263
have found evidence that risks that are generally overestimated
become more accurate when inducing a concrete mindset, while
very unlikely risks that are generally underestimated become more
accurate when inducing an abstract mindset. In sum, the current
ﬁndings imply that construal level theory should be considered in
risk communication and suggest further research concerning its
practical application.
Our ﬁndings contribute to decision making theory and highlight
the importance of subtle inﬂuences, such as perceived psycho-
logical distance, on practical decision making. However, further
research is needed to draw a clearer picture concerning the
interplay of framing and construal level, especially outside the lab-
oratory. Beyond that, it could be interesting to investigate how
construal level theory interacts with competing approaches in the
area of intuitive decision making. These approaches might include
fast-and-frugal heuristics (Gigerenzer, Todd, & The ABC Research
Group, 1999), fuzzy-trace theory (Reyna & Brainerd, 1995), the
adaptive decision maker (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993), or con-
nectionist models such as parallel constraint satisfaction (Glöckner
& Betsch, 2008). These ideas go beyond the scope of this article, but
carry great potential for future research.
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